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Abstract
Focusing on the case of Colombia, this article sets out a sociological examination of
constitutions marked by strong, activist judiciaries, by entrenched systems of human
rights protection, and by emphatic implementation of global human rights law. Contra
standard critiques of this constitutional model, it argues that such constitutions need to be
seen as creating a new pattern of democracy, which is often distinctively adapted to
structures in societies in which the typical patterns of legitimation and subject formation
required for democratic government were obstructed. In polities with such constitutions,
legal institutions and norm setters have at times assumed the status of functional
equivalents for more typical democratically mandated actors and institutions. In such
polities, further, global law assumes essential importance as it creates new sources of
normative authorization for legislation and stimulates new lines of articulation between
government and society. The article concludes that analysis of such polities, exemplified
by Colombia, shows that the common categories of democratic-constitutional analysis are
no longer always adequate for understanding current tendencies in democratic formation,
and they can easily undermine democracy itself.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, a model of national constitutionalism has become widespread that deviates
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to the emergence of a global constitutional order, as it is characterized by the fact that domestic
constitutional norms reflect international human rights law, and international norm setters
often predefine the basic principles of the national constitution.1 This model is marked, further,
by the fact that, within the domestic polity, judicial bodies assume particular prominence, and
they subject political institutions to strict control, at times curbing legislative activity, or even
acquiring legislative responsibilities.2 The acquisition of such authority by judicial institutions
is normally justified on the grounds that they enforce norms based, either directly or indirectly,
in international human rights law.3 In this model, as a result, legislative force is not solely
vested in agents of popular sovereignty, and the original authority to initiate legislative acts
may reside in transnational organizations, supranational judicial organs, or domestic courts,
applying international norms. Generally distinctive in this model of democracy is that the legal
system operates at a high degree of autonomy in the national political order, and the relative
power of legal institutions is sustained by the fact that national constitutional law is opened to a
system of global norms. Overall, this model can be classified as judicial constitutionalism or
even as transnational judicial constitutionalism.
The emergence of this constitutional model has stimulated a number of very critical com-
mentaries. It is often asserted in such commentaries that the legal system in this model leads to
the weakening of democracy, owing to the fact that it allows international norms externally to
pre-construct the legislative decisions of sovereign populations.4 In particular, it is claimed that
this model relativizes the significance of national constituent power as the original source of
constitutional law, as the popular will can only form a basis for government if proportioned to the
existing corpus of hyper-entrenched international human rights law.5 It is also argued that this
model diminishes the importance of politics per se, as judicial intervention in political processes
means that legislation loses its distinctive quality as politically legitimated. Theorists grouped
together as exponents of political constitutionalism are outspoken in this line of critique, arguing
that, in any legitimate political system, the decisions of strictly sovereign political subjects must
form the premise for legislation, and these decisions must be expressed through a legislature.6
These theorists thus immovably oppose polities with strongly autonomous legal systems. Some
extreme perspectives view the judicial pattern of constitutionalism as facilitating the semi-
tyrannical hegemony of powerful international actors, as it allows global elites to dictate policy
constraints to populations with weaker positions within the global economy.7
These critiques of transnational judicial constitutionalism are susceptible to query on a range of
grounds. Increasingly, such critiques can be repudiated, simply, because they are politically
irresponsible. In many contemporary societies, democracy is coming under attack from neo-
nationalist governments, often appearing in varying shades of populism. This is visible for example
in Hungary, Poland, Brazil, India, the UK, and the USA. In each of these polities, historically, the
1 See the discussion of global constitutionalism from human rights perspectives in Milewicz (2008), Schwöbel
(2011) and Peters (2014).
2 Stone Sweet (2000); Alter (2001, 54); Ferejohn (2002).
3 This is inevitably the case in courts working within supranational human rights systems. But important
decisions by other powerful courts are often authorized through reference, direct or indirect, to international
human rights. See the case in Constitutional Court Case No. CCT/3/94 S v Makwanyane and Another (6
June 1995) (South African Constitutional Court) and the case in Chameli Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr.
(AIR 1996 2 SCC 549; Date of Judgement [Indian Supreme Court]).
4 See Hirschl (2000, 2007), Waldron (2006), Bellamy (2007), Colon-Rios (2014) and Gargarella (2015).
5 See this debate in Patberg (2013), Thornhill (2014) and Krivenko (2017, 100).
6 See note 9 below.
7 Schneiderman (2008).
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interaction between national institutions and global norm setters played an important role in
stabilizing and expanding democracy. However, each polity is now experiencing a reduction in
the quality of democracy. In each case, democratic crisis is reflected in hostility to global norms and
scepticism towards domestic judicial institutions, at least to the extent that such institutions protect
global normative principles. In some respects, advocates of emphatically political variants on
constitutionalism have propagated a diction of political legitimation that favours the re-emergence
of populist nationalism. The insistence of such theorists that legitimate governmentmust be founded,
simply, in the sovereignwill of national citizens is close to some aspects of the populist stance, and it
can easily unsettle the democratic systems of governance that constitutional theorists purport to
defend.8When theoretical outlooks directly coincide with processes that lead to the negation of their
own professed purpose, such outlooks, evidently, require urgent revision.
Critiques of judicial constitutionalism can be rejected, second, on the ground that they lack
an adequate sociological understanding of democratic politics. In some ways, the political
irresponsibility reflected in critiques of judicial constitutionalism is the product of their
sociological insensitivity, which leads them to endorse simplified and counterfactual normative
constructs. Such critiques presuppose, paradigmatically, that democracy is a polity type that is
legitimated, invariably, by the fact that social agents participate equally in law making through
legislative or other representative institutions.9 In this regard, such critiques are inclined to
apply the norms of classical democratic theory very literally, and they impute legitimational
processes in democracy to a strictly construed set of norm-producing practices, expressed in
concepts of popular sovereignty, citizenship, and collective will formation, and they presume
that all societies contain political subjects able to construct legitimacy for legislation through
such practices.10 Moreover, such critiques presume that every society has the capacity to
impose a representative structure on its articulations with such political subjects, so that the
interests of sovereign citizens can be straightforwardly mediated through legislative institu-
tions. In many settings, however, the vocabulary of democratic theory projects legitimational
processes that cannot be aligned to actual conditions of government. In many societies, the
legitimational forms imputed to democracy in conventional conceptual constructions of
political subjectivity do not exist, and the political system cannot easily be articulated with
the subjects from which it is expected to extract legitimacy. Even in classical democratic
societies, the presumption that democratic institutions were legitimated by national populations
formed as volitional subjects was a fiction, and the demos conceived as the source of
institutional legitimacy had to be created by political institutions themselves.11 In many
contemporary democracies, the idea that the political system can obtain legitimacy through
immediate exchanges with organized political subjects is plainly reductive. Accordingly, many
critiques of judicial democracy, especially those that insist on legislative institutions as the
necessary fulcrum of democracy, analyse the preconditions of legitimate democracy by
8 For example, in the UK, advocates of political constitutionalism have often endorsed classical theories of
parliamentary sovereignty, and this has provided a conceptual armoury to support politicians seeking to leave the
European Union. The result has laid bare the deep crisis of national democratic institutions in the UK. Some
theorists have noted a necessary proximity between populism and more standard constitutional-democratic theory
(see Canovan (1999, 14) and Blokker (2018)).
9 See standard iterations in Bellamy (2008, 154), Webber (2009, 215) and Loughlin (2010). Bellamy’s assertion
that constitutional democracy is a ‘form of politics that strives to motivate law-making in the public interest and
render it accountable to citizens’ presupposes, immediately, the material existence of a public body of citizens,
which provide the political foundation for democracy (see Bellamy (1996, 456)).
10 Webber (2009, 18).
11 See Kelsen (1950, 6–7).
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fictitious standards, and their challenge to existing democratic polities promotes a deep
simplification of democratic legitimation.
This article aims to add a new sociological analysis of democracy to debate about
global-legal or global-judicial patterns of constitutionalism. It uses this analysis to assess
this democratic model by criteria that are sensitively adapted to the societal conditions in
which democratic polities are located, seeking, thus, to avoid the reductivism inherent in
many critiques of judicial constitutionalism. More importantly, this article seeks to
promote an understanding of democracy able to resist the current shift towards democratic
simplification in constitutional theory and practice. It attempts to outline a complex
framework for analysis of democracy, and, in this respect, it is guided by the conviction
that adequate sociological comprehension of democracy is essential to its continued
development. The categories in which democracy is typically analysed are not adequate
to its factual foundations, and this contributes to the risks that frequently surround
contemporary democracy. Above all, the fixation of democratic theory on static constructs
of sovereignty and popular citizenship requires sharp correction if contemporary democ-
racies are to be reliably interpreted and the case for democracy securely advanced.
Democracy, it is contended here, needs to be observed as a socially variable mode of
political formation. In essence, democracy is a polity type that is oriented towards the
production of consensual legitimacy for law, and in which law is distributed through society
on premises created through broad consensus. Naturally, there are some conditions that all
democracies need to satisfy, in order to qualify as such. The most indispensable amongst such
conditions is full enfranchisement of the population in regular competitive elections, without
exclusion from the exercise of electoral rights on grounds of ethnicity, socio-economic
position, or gender.12 Above this threshold, however, democratic systems need not presuppose
one single legitimational process, and the lines of communication between the polity and
subjects in society cannot be fixed to uniform categories of political agency and subjectivity.
There is in fact no compelling reason why concepts of democracy should be configured around
simple analyses of popular sovereignty. During the first emergence of democracy, it was
widely intuited, especially amongst sociologists, that democratic polities had been brought into
being by transpersonal processes of social transformation, and they evolved as variable
instruments for creating legitimacy for law, under conditions of rising social complexity. On
this account, the growth of democracy was driven by the integrational expansion of society as
a whole, and democracy acquired legitimacy as a polity type able to produce consensus for law
in a form adapted to the complex environments and the varied subjective forms that modern
society increasingly contained.13 On this view, democracy could emerge in highly contingent
fashion, and it was not necessarily instituted by considered acts of rational, participatory, or
eminently political subjects. On this view, further, citizens could create consensual premises
for law in multiple roles, not all focused on conventional electoral activities, and the rights
through which citizens shape legislative acts and bring legitimacy to law could be exercised in
manifold, complex fashion.14
This classical sociological analysis of democracy retains validity today. As mentioned,
many democracies are confronted with deep challenges in constructing the subjects around
12 Dahl (1998, 78).
13 Durkheim (1902, 28–29); Weber (1921/22, 571). For a more programmatic recent statement of this outlook,
see Luhmann (1983[1969]).
14 Thornhill (2018, 39–133).
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which they are expected to explain their legitimacy. In many settings, even primary categories
of democratic agency and personhood—the sovereign people, the national citizen—cannot
easily be mapped onto factually existing subjects, and the capacity of the political system for
articulating with and representing such subjects is minimal. In many settings, polities have
been required to institutionalize legitimational practices, and even to construct democratic
agents and subjects, in improvised adaptive processes, and atypical patterns of integration are
needed before democratic legitimation can occur. If observed closely, in fact, many democ-
racies have evolved, at least in part, around functional equivalents to classical democratic
forms of legitimation and subject formation. Sociological attentiveness to such complex
phenomena is vital for understanding the current realities of democracy. In particular, reflec-
tion on such phenomena is important for interpreting the prevalence of global-judicial models
of constitutionalism in contemporary society. In many respects, this model has emerged as a
system of equivalence, in which global human rights norms act as surrogates for classical
patterns of norm production, allowing the political system to integrate social actors (citizens)
persons in society and to legitimate legislation in a form that compensates for the weak
formation of political subjects in national society. In this model, the legal system acts at a
high level of autonomy specifically, not to reduce democracy, but to construct equivalents for
classical democratic procedures, often in societies where such procedures do not gain imme-
diate traction. A perspective that reflects on constitutional law, not solely as a normative order,
but as an adaptive system for constructing legitimacy for law, is thus required to capture the
present form of democracy.
This article develops these claims, specifically, by examining constitutional conditions in
Colombia. Colombia is selected for analysis because, since 1991, its polity is one of the most
extreme examples of transnational judicial constitutionalism. For this reason, some critics of judicial
activism have singled out Colombia for admonishment, implying that more classical patterns of
constitutional organization should be preferred.15 Indeed, hostility to judicial power in Colombia has
been sharply articulated in governmental policy. Colombia itself is now threatened by the anti-
judicial tendencies seen in other countries, especially those that have embarked on the path to more
populist governmental techniques.16 On these grounds, Colombia provides a case study both for
assessing the correlation between judicial influence and democratic institutionalization and for
observing how democracy might be unsettled by more classical processes of political mobilization.
Most importantly, Colombia is examined here as a society in which, for embedded historical
reasons, the political system faced acute problems of socio-political integration and democratic
subject construction. The study of Colombia shows emphatically that, in some settings, the basic
15 One Colombian author has argued that the Constitutional Court has transformed itself illegitimately into the
‘final link in the pyramid of public power’: López Daza (2011, 172) (see more subtle analysis in Higuera Jiménez
(2009)).
16 Research for this article was mainly conducted in the period 2015–2017. During this time, the Colombian
Constitutional Court was affected by several events that threatened to alter its institutional role and to reduce its
authority. At different points in time, the composition of the Court was changed, and a new judicial system,
dealing exclusively with cases arising from the civil conflict, was placed alongside the existing judiciary. Then,
Ivan Duque was elected Colombian President in 2018. Duque is overtly hostile to aspects of international law,
and he has threatened to dismantle the Constitutional Court and to weaken the power of the judiciary more
generally. With other leaders in South America, in 2019 he issued a joint communication to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, arguing for an increase in the autonomy of national courts within the Inter-
American Human Rights System. Despite this, the orientation of the Constitutional Court has not yet been
substantially revised, and its decisions still reflect a strong commitment to recognition of international human
rights law (see Decision C-252 of 2019 (Justice Carlos Bernal Pulido)).
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subjects of democratic legitimation—including, even, the people themselves—do not exist as
simply manifest entities. On the contrary, political institutions obtain legitimacy by devising
equivalents to the subjects from which they are expected to extract legitimacy and through which
they produce legislation. In consequence, the case of Colombia demands a deep revision of theways
in which classical principles of democracy are applied to material constitutional realities. Above all,
it demands a sociological reconstruction of core categories of democratic theory, and it shows that, in
some settings, democracy itself may need to be re-thought if it is to be sustainably defended.
This article is not alone in claiming that transnational constitutional norms have democracy-
enhancing results. However, more favourable discussions of transnational judicial constitu-
tionalism have usually proceeded from a position located within classical accounts of democ-
racy.17 Typically, such positive analyses claim that such constitutions improve the quality of
democracy by stabilizing justified legislative outcomes;18 by providing strong checks on
political branches, averting uncontrolled executive enactment of global directives;19 and by
stimulating public deliberation on core executive decisions.20 By contrast, using one empirical
case study, this article argues that accurate analysis of judicial constitutional forms may require
that we adopt a new sociological lens for understanding core democratic functions.
2 Colombia, Democracy and Global Human Rights Law
At one level, Colombia has a relatively long-standing and continuous history of competitive
democracy, whose origins reach back to the middle of the nineteenth century. Unusually for
Latin America, Colombia has only limited experience with military intervention in civil
politics, and rotation of governmental office has only infrequently been interrupted.21 None-
theless, as discussed below, democracy in Colombia has a fragile history, and it has often
possessed only formal or nominal character. Distinctive features in the structure of Colombian
society—in particular, deep cultural fissures between different regions and extreme material
variations between different groups, high prevalence of private power and patrimonialism, and
low societal convergence around centralized institutions—have meant that, historically, dem-
ocratic institutions could not easily be consolidated. As discussed below, this is reflected in the
fact that formal state institutions have often been rivalled in force by other organizations, the
political system was endemically porous to elite interests, societal antagonisms often resulted
in seismic violence and protracted civil conflict between different socio-political groups, and
democratically mandated governance bodies often relied on prerogative legislation to preserve
their control. In each respect, the formation of Colombian democracy has been marked by
acute problems in the integrational dimensions of the polity, and the basic structural inclusivity
required to connect societal actors to democratic institutions has not been fully established.
Overall, at key junctures, the public authority of the state was only patchily felt in society, and
the ability of state institutions to attach their legitimacy to integrated citizens was weak.22
Against this background, the current governmental order in Colombia can be seen, para-
digmatically, as a polity that has been created through international human rights law. Indeed,
17 See Freeman (1990, 367).
18 Zurn (2007, 246).
19 See Benvenisti (2008, 272).
20 Benvenisti and Downs (2012), 167).
21 See Uribe de Hincapié (1998, 26).
22 See García Villegas (2009, 24, 43, 48).
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it is a polity in which the global rise of human rights has helped to remedy deep-lying
structural-integrational problems that impeded democratic institution building.
Important researchers are currently exploring the historical genealogies of human rights law
in Colombia.23 At an immediate level, however, human rights law began to gain impact in
Colombia in the 1980s, during the extreme crisis of democracy caused by escalating civil
conflict and acute state repression. In this period, proponents of rival ideologies in Colombia,
attached to hostile positions in the civil conflict, began to explain their prerogatives in the
register of international human rights.24 Simultaneously, international organizations became
increasingly engaged with the causes and consequences of the violence in Colombia, leading
to the heightened domestic penetration of global instruments as means for conflict resolution.
In 1985, the Colombian government accepted jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (IACtHR), intensifying the enforcement of the American Convention on
Human Rights (ACHR) within Colombia. However, the most important early step in the legal
consolidation of human rights occurred in 1990, during a state of exception imposed because
of the intensification of civil conflict. Responding to this situation, successive Presidents
issued two emergency decrees, Decree 927/1990 and Decree 1926/1990, which led to the
creation of a National Constitutional Assembly in early 1991 to draft a new constitution for the
Republic.25 The Constitution produced by the Constituent Assembly was adopted in 1991.
The 1991 Constitution was conceived partly in conventional terms, as a formal document to
regulate functions of state. But it was also conceived as a political pact or inter-group treaty. In
particular, the new Constitution was designed to establish working arrangements between
select parties in the civil conflict, to expand popular participation in public functions, and—by
these means—to solidify the basic institutions of the state.26 Different parties in the
constitution-making process shared a strong orientation towards human rights, and human
rights figured prominently in debates in the Constituent Assembly.27
Ultimately, the prominence of human rights during the period of constitution
making in 1991 was reflected in the final text of the Colombian Constitution, which
forms a classical example of the rights-based, judicial constitutional model. This is
visible both in the Constitution itself and in the strategies by means of which its core
provisions were put into effect:
2.1 The Structure of the Constitution
The 1991 Constitution provides for different categories of rights, with varying status and
enforceability. It establishes a series of fundamental rights, centred on classical rights and
rights of personal dignity, which are immediately enforceable. However, it establishes a range
of rights, albeit granted weaker protection, which extend beyond classical human rights. For
instance, Article 49 determines that the state is responsible for organizing, directing and
regulating the delivery of health services and environmental protection. Article 79 establishes
certain environmental rights, declaring that the state has a duty to ‘protect the diversity and
23 González Jácome (2018).
24 Grajales (2017, 59–61); González Jácome (2015, 231–32). For a rather different view, see Tate (2007, 101).
25 The same Decree No. 1926 that convened a National Constitutional Assembly in 24 August 1990 declared a
state of exception. In 1996, Colombia had been governed under states of emergency for 36 years out of the
previous 44 (see Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1997, 660)).
26 This objective shaped Decree 927/1990 that led to the Constituent Assembly.
27 Restrepo Yepes, Bocanument Arvelaez and Rojas Betancur (2014, 287, 304).
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integrity of the environment, to conserve areas of special ecological importance, and to foster
education for the achievement of these ends’. Art 67 declares that education is ‘an individual
right and a public service that has a social function’. Alongside this, the Constitution
emphasizes the importance of labour rights (Arts 53–57), indicating that private property
implies inherent social and ecological obligations (Arts 58–60, 63–64). As part of its general
guarantee of equality (Art 13), it recognizes the rights of vulnerable and historically discrim-
inated groups, such as women (Art 43), children and adolescents (Arts 44 and 45), disabled
people (Art 47), and ethnic minorities. Indigenous groups had three representatives in the
Assembly that wrote the Constitution, and they obtained rights of representation, self-gover-
nance, and qualified judicial autonomy (Arts 171, 246, 329, 330, 356), most of which were
already envisaged in existing international instruments.
Important in this respect is the fact that the Constitution promotes a two-level conception of
human rights. It constructs a framework in which human rights can be viewed both as a set of
strictly positive norms and as an autonomous and evolving sphere of the law. Distinctively,
first, Article 94 states that ‘the rights and guarantees contained in the Constitution and in
international conventions shall not be understood as a denial of other rights inherent in the
human person, which are not expressly stipulated in those documents’. This Article was
subsequently interpreted to imply that the catalogue of rights in the Constitution could be
enlarged, or subject to enhanced judicial construction. As discussed below, this Article
provided an important context, in which judicial actors could promote an expansionary
approach to basic rights. Second, as examined below, the fact that it emphasizes post-
classical rights means that historically vulnerable sectors of society have been able to engage
directly with the political system through the medium of rights, and the societal reach of basic
constitutional provisions has been augmented because of this.
2.2 The Structure of the Judiciary
In addition to consolidating basic rights, the 1991 Constitution provides a robust apparatus to
ensure their protection, enforcement, and democratic elaboration, and it added new organs to
the judiciary.
Significant amongst the judicial institutions created by the Constitution are the Constitu-
tional Court, which, as the highest judicial organ, has constitutional jurisdiction; the Council of
State (Consejo de Estado), which has administrative jurisdiction; the Supreme Court, with
ordinary jurisdiction; and the Superior Council of the Judiciary, with disciplinary jurisdiction.
In addition, the Constitution established a Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueb-
lo). The Constitution also created specific organs to supervise branches of government, in
response to human rights violations. After the Constitution entered force, additional human
rights mechanisms were established, including bodies to deal with litigation before interna-
tional courts, with the implementation of international judicial rulings, and with domestic
reparation for breaches of human rights.28 Alongside this, the Constitution sets out provisions
for new types of legal action and representation in human rights cases. Amongst these are
provisions for public interest litigation, designed to protect collective interests and fundamental
28 Some examples are Resolution 0-2725/1994, creating a National Body of Human Rights Prosecutors; Law
228/1996, establishing instruments to guarantee compensation to victims following decisions of international
organs; Law 1448/2011, known as Law of Victims and Land Restitution, establishing compensatory mechanisms
for victims of the civil conflict, and flanked by the creation of a Monitoring Commission for Implementation of
Law 1448/2011.
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rights (Art 88). Most importantly, the Constitution makes provision for the filing of tutelas (Art
86). Tutelas are petitions that allow an individual citizen to demand suspension of any action
or omission of a governmental or private entity that threatens a fundamental right. Although
the instrument of the tutela is not in itself new, it has acquired very distinctive implications in
Colombia. In Colombia, a tutela can be filed in very informal manner, even in oral and
handwritten form. As a result, tutelas have often been submitted by marginal subjects, relating
to abuses of rights that afflict persons in disadvantaged social positions, and they have led to an
exponential increase in access to law for such subjects. Tutelas can also be filed by proxies,
through agencia oficiosa, to represent interests of a subject who cannot ‘promote his or her
own defence’—that is, for instance, a subject whose immediate access to justice is restricted
for literacy-related, cultural, or geographical reasons.29 As discussed below, tutelas have
acquired a central role in the promotion of fundamental rights and in the extension of the
societal reach of legal organs, and they have often provided openings for legal actors to
construct new rights or to extend existing rights to new subjects.
2.3 The Constitution and International Human Rights Law
The 1991 Constitution accords a privileged position to international human rights law in the
domestic legal order. It states that international treaties ratified by the Congress that recognize
human rights should have precedence over domestic norms; it forbids the limitation of these
rights during states of emergency; and it stipulates that human rights treaties shall be used as
interpretative guides for realizing the rights and duties defined in the Constitution (Art 93). The
special position given to international human rights law has been strengthened by judgements
of the Constitutional Court. Generally, the Court has adopted the principle that international
human rights norms are identical with the values declared in domestic constitutional law,30 so
that domestic rights provisions need to be purposively aligned to international norms. It has
also ruled that international norms prevail over domestic law in cases in which they give
stronger protection to human rights.31 Importantly, it has recently strengthened this line of
jurisprudence, to argue that international human rights law must have higher standing than
principles set out in other spheres of international law.32
On this basis, the Court has tended to use international norms to harden its own power in
relation to other branches of government in the elaboration of constitutional norms. At an early
stage, the Court declared that the sovereignty of governmental institutions should be seen as
strictly constrained by international human rights law, claiming that human rights ‘are too
important for their protection to be left exclusively in the hands of states’.33 In this, it proposed
itself as the custodian of global human rights law, entitled to check the power of government
bodies on globally authorized grounds. More specifically, in a ruling of 1992, the Court
established criteria to determine whether a right has a fundamental character and is subject to
petition by tutela. It decided that such criteria are met if the right in question is protected in an
international human rights treaty.34 In so doing, the Court significantly widened the scope of
29 Decision T-267 of 2011 (Justice Mauricio González Cuervo).
30 Decision C-408 of 1996 (Justice Alejandro Martínez Caballero).
31 The Court articulated this principle in Decision C-148 of 2005 (Justice Alvaro Tafur Galvis); Decision C-187
of 2006 (Justice Clara Inés Vargas Hernández); Decision C-438 of 2013 (Justice Alberto Rojas Rios).
32 Decision C-252 of 2019 (Justice Carlos Bernal Pulido).
33 Decision C-408 of 1996 (Justice Alejandro Martínez Caballero).
34 Decision T-002 of 1992 (Justice Alejandro Martinez Caballero).
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its own jurisdiction. In some cases, the Court has simply interpreted internationally defined
rights as domestic constitutional rights. Relying on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, for example, the Court
established a right to subsistence and a right to a minimum living standard, and these rights
were subsequently used to prescribe public policies to the government.35
As part of this commitment to domestic entrenchment of international human rights law, the
Constitutional Court has established the core doctrine of the block of constitutionality,
originally derived and modified from French public law. Central to this doctrine is the
principle that some internationally recognized norms that are not expressly mentioned in the
Constitution can be accorded near-constitutional rank, and they can be applied as ‘parameters
for testing the constitutionality of laws’.36 Ultimately, the Court extracted great latitude from
this doctrine, and it incorporated a broad range of international norms in domestic public law.
For example, it decided that international soft-law norms regarding the rights of displaced
persons, especially the Deng and Pinheiro principles promulgated under UN auspices, should
be construed as binding sources of domestic rights.37 It also directly incorporated the ACHR,
and, by extension, the rulings of the IACtHR. The jurisprudence of the IACtHR thus assumed
a de facto constitutional position in Colombian public law.38 In later cases, the Court imputed a
special force to the jurisprudence of international human rights organs.39 The international
norms absorbed in the block of constitutionality have been defined as obligatory, not only for
public entities, but also for non-state actors. Consequently, international human rights have
been interpreted to form a binding legal/constitutional structure for all persons in society,40
leading to the deep penetration of international law in the practices of everyday life.
2.4 The Constitutional Court
From the outset, overall, the Colombian Constitutional Court emerged as a highly activist
Court, with a very distinctive constitutional role and a prominent position in the polity as a
whole.41 Notably, the fact that the National Constituent Assembly was established during a
state of emergency had important immediate consequences for the Constitutional Court. The
Constituent Assembly, convoked in February 1991, finished writing the Constitution in
July 1991. With the support of the President César Gaviria (1990–1994), the Constituent
Assembly dissolved the regular Congress, instituted a transitional legislative body known as El
Congresito (‘the mini Congress’), and called elections to form a new Congress. During its
limited mandate from July to November 1991, El Congresito formalized certain exceptional
provisions enacted by the government during the state of emergency. This meant that, directly
after ratification of the Constitution, emergency legislation was in force, which curtailed the
effect of the human rights in the Constitution. The fact that, at its enactment, the new
35 Decision T-426 of 1992 (Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz).
36 Decision C-225 of 1995 (Justice Alejandro Martínez Caballero).
37 See Decision T-327 of 2001 (Justice Jorge Ignacio Pretelt Chaljub); Decision T-068 of 2010 (Justice Jorge
Ignacio Pretelt Chaljub). See Vidal López (2007, 41).
38 See discussion in Decision T-1319 of 2001 (Justice Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes). One account argues that the
Court strives for ‘permanent harmonization’ between domestic law and the norms in the Inter-American human
rights system: Santofimio Gamboa (2017, 134).
39 Decision T-568 of 1999 (Justice Carlos Gaviria Díaz); Decision C-010 of 2000 (Justice Alejandro Martínez
Caballero).
40 See Decision C-225 of 1995 (Justice Alejandro Martínez Caballero).
41 For theoretical background, see López Medina (2004, 414–17).
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Constitution was subject to restrictive provisions meant that the Constitutional Court quickly
assumed an activist role. In some of its earliest rulings, it nullified on grounds of unconstitu-
tionality some acts introduced by the interim Congress,42 claiming elevated powers to defend
the Constitution.43
Partly as a result of these factors, the Constitutional Court soon began to act as the
repository of constituent power. Even before the drafting of the Constitution, in fact, the
Supreme Court approved the Decrees that led to the convocation of the Constituent Assembly
in 1991. It declared that these Decrees were legitimate because they ensured that the people
were able to act as the ‘primary constituent’ of the state.44 After 1991, the Constitutional Court
construed the constituent power of the people and the normative force of human rights as
essentially identical, and it assumed entitlement to act as protector of both. In one of its first
decisions, the Court declared that it was entitled to decide which rights can be ranked as
fundamental and to establish protection and remedies accordingly.45 It also constructively
interpreted the value of human dignity expressed in the Constitution as a meta-norm, which it
construed as a teleological directive to enlarge the system of rights protecting human dignity,
especially in the ‘social dimension’ of human life.46 In both respects, the Court interpreted the
human rights provisions in the Constitution as providing a broad warrant for its assumption of
de facto constituent powers.
The distinctive position of the Constitutional Court is most evident in its tutela
rulings, in which it has routinely performed functions that far exceed normal obligations
for judicial scrutiny. In some cases, for example, the Court has decided that tutela cases
have broad social implications, such that its decision in one case needs to be accorded a
widened scope, setting precedents for parties other than the individuals directly involved
in the given adjudicatory process: such decisions are ascribed inter comunis effect.47 A
decision was imputed inter comunis effect for the first time in 2001.48 In some rulings
with inter comunis effect, the Court has claimed that the case brought before it reflects a
condition of structural unconstitutionality, or ‘an unconstitutional state of affairs’, and it
has formulated its judgement in order to remedy a set of problems that resonate widely
across society as a whole. Rulings of this kind include cases in which a violation of
human rights reported in a tutela is judged by the Court to be the result of deep-rooted
structural causes, not solely attributable to one entity or to one public authority, and
requiring far-reaching solutions.49 Early instances of such rulings can be found in prison
law, social security law, health law, and in education law, which were focused on
42 See Decision C-479 of 1992 (Justices Jose Gregorio Hernandez Galindo and Alejandro Martínez Caballero),
declaring the inapplicability of part of transitory decree 2067/1991 enacted by El Congresito; Decision C-543 of
1992 (Justice Jose Gregorio Hernandez Galindo), declaring unenforceable Article 11 of Decree 2591/1991. Other
rulings affirmed the role of judicial decisions in creating rights alongside the legislative process (see Decision T-
406 of 1992 (Justice Ciro Angarita Baron)).
43 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1993).
44 Cajas Sarria (2015, 406).
45 Decision T-002 of 1992 (Justice Alejandro Martinez Caballero).
46 Decision T-881 of 2002 (Justice Eduardo Montealegre Lynett).
47 See Decision T-025 of 2015 (Justice Gabriel Eduardo Mendoza Martelo), extending the right to have access to
benefits from a healthcare program “Colombia Mayor” (Great Colombia) to all elderly people residing in a
certain area. Other examples of decisions with effects inter pares are Decision T-534 of 1992 (Justice Ciro
Angarita Baron); Decision T-583 of 2006 (Justice Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra); Auto 071 of 2001 (Justice
Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa).
48 Decision SU-1023 of 2001 (Justice Jaime Córdoba Triviño).
49 Decision T-025 of 2004 (Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa).
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systemic, but relatively circumscribed institutional crises.50 Instances of this are espe-
cially important in environmental law cases.51 However, the most important cases of this
kind relate to the conditions of population groups displaced by civil violence, in
addressing which the Court has issued judgements with very broad implications for the
normative structure of society in its entirety. In such cases, the Court has assumed
authority to prescribe multiple remedies with binding effect for all parties implicated in
the instant case and for all persons affected by conditions similar to those revealed in the
given tutela. The leading cases of this kind are strongly supported by international law,
and violation of international human rights law is often seen as grounds to justify the
designation of a tutela as displaying structural unconstitutionality and to authorize the
resultant attribution of inter comunis effect to the relevant decision.52
In these respects, the Constitutional Court has clearly acted simultaneously as a constituent,
legislative, and as a policymaking organ. Indeed, it is often motivated by the sense that it is
obliged to assume broad powers of legislation, as it views other branches of government,
especially Congress, as ineffective in the performance of political responsibilities.53
3 Global Law, Democratic Citizenship and Structural Adaption
In these respects, the Colombian Constitution stands at an extreme position on the spectrum of
judicial authority and activism. As mentioned, the distinctive position of legal institutions in
the Colombian polity means that is often viewed as the leading example of judicial constitu-
tionalism, in which judicial bodies that apply global norms usurp functions properly exercised
by democratically mandated branches of government. However, this description is only
sustainable from a perspective that adopts a sociologically static account of democracy. The
relative autonomy of legal bodies can equally be viewed as forming a system of equivalence,
in which the assimilation of global human rights law into Colombian society obtains deep
structural impact, creating preconditions for democracy that compensate for weaknesses in
national democratic formation. Such structural impact is evident in the fact that global law
consolidates institutional foundations for democracy that had been absent as society persisted
in its purely national form. Such structural impact is also manifest in the fact that global law
generates surrogates for more conventional forms of political agency and subject formation,
and it promotes consensus production for law in a form adapted to the material fabric of
Colombian society.
50 Decision T-153 of 1998 (Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz); Decision T-068 of 1998 (Justice Alejandro
Martinez Caballero); Decision SU-559 of 1997 (Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz).
51 For example, in Decision T-291 of 2009 (Justice Clara Elena Reales Gutiérrez), orders regarding recycling
were extended from one case to include an entire city (Cali). Other examples are Decision T-203 of 2002 (Justice
Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa); Decision SU 783 of 2003 (Justice Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra); Decision SU
636 of 2003 (Justice Jaime Araujo Renteria); Decision T-843 of 2009 (Justice Jorge Ignacio Pretelt Chaljub);
Decision T-088 of 2011 (Justice Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva); Decision T-213A of 2011 (Justice Gabriel Eduardo
Mendoza Martelo); Decision T-149 of 2016 (Justice Gabriel Eduardo Mendoza Martelo). See González-
Manrique et al. (2014, 181, 182).
52 This is not invariably the case. But some important rulings with inter comunis effect are strongly founded in
international law. See for example Decision SU-254 of 2013 (Justice Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva).
53 See Landau (2012).
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3.1 Institutional Formation
The structural impact of global law in Colombian society can be observed, quite simply, at the
level of institutional consolidation, as processes of judicial norm construction based in global
law have clearly diminished the force of some historical obstructions to democracy.
As mentioned, the establishment of a robust democracy in Colombia was impeded,
originally, by the fact that political institutions struggled to assert a monopoly of
power in society. One reason for this was that societal elites tended to resist the
formation of a strong national political system, preferring to safeguard their social
positions by private means and refusing to invest monetary resources (taxation)
required for effective building of state capacity.54 This meant that the fiscal revenue
needed to establish a strong overarching national state was not guaranteed. One
further reason for this was that members of political elites tended to occupy strongly
developed regional positions, and they often secured societal support, not through
national political representation, but by localized patrimonial means. This meant that
political organizations did not mediate effectively between national government and
regional constituencies.55 As a result, central institutions were often too weak to
sustain a nationally overarching legal/political system,56 and, in the absence of a
strong state structure, essential public functions were often arrogated by actors outside
the formal political domain, including guerrillas or paramilitaries.57 One important
analysis of the history of violence in Colombia has attributed the power of military
organizations directly to the reduced integrative reach of formal institutions.58 This set
of factors necessarily meant that one core precondition of democracy—the presence of
national institutions able to articulate closely with citizens in all parts of society—was
absent.
In this context, the penetration of global norms into Colombian society played a key role in
hardening the societal foundations of the political system and in creating structural foundations
for democracy. Indicatively, the Constitutional Court has declared that its use of global law is
driven by consciously ‘Weberian’ considerations, and its endeavour to solidify a body of
human rights in society is part of a policy to elevate the state’s monopoly of force vis-à-vis
other actors and organizations.59
The Constitutional Court gave strongest expression to this state-building strategy in
its most important tutela ruling, T-025/04. This ruling, which concerned victims of
mass displacement caused by civil violence, formed a central pillar for the later
jurisprudence of the Court, and it established parameters for the Court’s subsequent
activism in policy questions. In this tutela, the Court declared that the displacement
afflicting large numbers of Colombians indicated that the state itself was experiencing
a deep structural crisis. Accordingly, it decided that the instant tutela reflected, not an
isolated legal fact, but an unconstitutional state of affairs, to which the state itself had
54 Uribe López (2013, 198).
55 Uprimny (1989); Martz (1997).
56 García Villegas (2009, 60). For the view that the idea of ‘national community’ exists only as a fiction in
Colombia, see Pécaut (1999, 16).
57 González, Bolívar and Vázquez (2003, 31, 198, 231, 250, 257). One account describes the FARC as an ‘alter-
Estado’: Agnew and Oslender (2010, 201).
58 Arjona (2016, 81).
59 Decision SU-1150 of 2000 (Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz).
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causally contributed.60 In reaching this verdict, the Court argued that the structural
crisis of the state was measurable in criteria derived from human rights law: that is,
state failure was evident in the degree to which displaced population groups were
deprived of their rights.61 From this position, the Court concluded that provision of
guarantees for basic rights was a vital aspect of effective state structure and protection
of rights was a core measure of state capacity. From this position, then, it concluded
that it was authorized to prescribe remedies to public agencies to ensure that they
took measures to guarantee full enjoyment of basic rights amongst persons displaced
by conflict. In this respect, the Court viewed its own promotion of human rights as an
active contribution to the reinforcement of the state, serving to reinforce linkages
between the state and persons at different points in society. Eventually, the Court
drew up a series of indicators to evaluate the success of government bodies in
resolving the structural crisis. These indicators were largely based in standards
designed to measure the quality of human rights protection, partly drawn from
international law.62 As part of this process, international guidelines were invoked by
the Court to enhance the fiscal performance of the government and to improve lines
of communication between regional and national governmental bodies, both of which
were seen as preconditions for protection of displaced persons.63
In these respects, global law entered Colombian society as a medium of hard structural
reinforcement, and it served to remedy historical weaknesses in the institutions required to
sustain a democratic order. International human rights law acted to extend and stabilize an
increasingly solid institutional structure across society, able to integrate societal groups in a
setting in which national law had failed to accomplish this. Far from limiting the sovereign
power of the national state, global law entered national society as the bedrock for the
reinforcement of sovereign state institutions.
3.2 Citizenship Formation
The structural impact of global law in Colombia is also evident in other dimensions of society
that are vital for the consolidation of democracy. Even the basic construct of the citizen, the
primary fulcrum in the processes of integration and legitimation that sustain national democ-
racy, has evolved, some respects, as an artefact of global law.64
It is widely documented that in Colombia, as in many Latin American countries, the ideals
of national citizenship and popular sovereignty projected in classical constitutionalism did not
find a receptive environment. To be sure, both the Republic of New Granada (1831–1858)
and, after 1886, the Republic of Colombia were founded around such ideals. Yet, a number of
social factors meant that principles of national citizenship had restricted capacity to integrate
60 The first case in which the Court used the concept was Decision SU 559 of 1997 (Justice Eduardo Cifuentes
Muñoz), concerning pension rights. However, such reasoning gained traction in cases concerning the prison
system, particularly in Decision T-153 of 1998 (Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz), where the Court held that
conditions in the prison system reflected an unconstitutional state of affairs.
61 See Auto 109 of 2007 (Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa).
62 In one declaration, the Court stipulated that a ‘charter of basic rights for displaced people’ had to be
implemented, and fulfilment of this stipulation was a core indicator of compliance with the relevant jurisprudence
(see Auto 178 of 2005 (Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa)).
63 Auto 177 of 2005 (Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa).
64 On the primary role of the citizen in promoting national integration, see Bendix (1996[1964]) and
Gosewinkel (2001).
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society. In consequence, society as a whole did not acquire a fully nationalized shape and
governmental legitimacy could not easily be attached to simple expressions of popular
sovereignty.
First, during the nineteenth century, Colombian society possessed an extremely localized
structure, and local sources of authority retained a dominant position as foci of socio-political
co-ordination and obligation.65 As mentioned, patronage widely stood in for national political
participation as a source of political loyalty and authority.66 One important account describes
early Colombian citizenship as ‘hybrid citizenship’, containing disparate elements of local,
clientelistic, and national obligations.67 The Constitution of 1886 formally promoted rigidly
centralized statehood and uniform citizenship, but, in reality, central institutions did not pierce
deeply into the pluralistic fibre of society.68 Second, as indicated, social elites in Colombia
were often unwilling to support a nationally unifying political order, and one core precondition
for a solid national political order (i.e. a sustainable fiscal system, to which citizens were
willing to commit a portion of their income) was difficult to establish.69 The material basis of
citizenship was, therefore, always precarious. Most obviously, third, the intermittent periods of
extremely high social violence reflected the weak articulation of citizenship. This violence had
its origins in anti-colonial movements, and it was intensified by contests over land and
resources beginning in the nineteenth century.70 More structurally, however, violence was
induced by the disjuncture between state and society, which meant that insurrectionist patterns
of participation or citizenship often appeared more likely to yield benefits than formal or
nationally institutionalized political interaction.71 This violence exploded most catastrophically
in the civil conflicts of the 1940s and 1950s and the 1980s and 1990s. In these periods, the
insurgents and paramilitaries that took control of society often formed de facto governance
regimes, establishing shadowy analogues to state institutions in some regions, even creating
judicial orders and rudimentary fiscal systems.72 Inevitably, this meant that national citizen-
ship, based in territorially overarching claims to rights of inclusion and participation, possessed
a fictional quality.73 In each respect, the multi-polar form of citizenship militated against the
consolidation of subjects able to sustain democracy.
The Constitution of 1991 marked a strategic response to these problems. In the first
instance, the impetus for the writing of the new Constitution came, in part, from social
movements and student groups, who saw the formation of a new trans-sectoral constitutional
pact, designed to create robust and consensually founded institutions, as a pathway out of
violence.74 The writing of the Constitution involved representatives of different social groups,
including some—although not all—of the actors in the civil violence, and during the drafting
process consultation bodies were institutionalized to mobilize and coordinate civic engage-
ment. Although written in a representative assembly, the Constitution was shaped by a multi-
centric constituent power, in which previously marginalized factions, divided by their
65 Conde Calderón (2009, 271); Márquez Estrada (2011).
66 Leal Buitrago and Ladrón de Guevara (1990).
67 Uribe de Hincapié (1996, 75).
68 See the classic study in Leal Buitrago (2016), 115. See excellent analysis in Palacios (1980, 1631).
69 Uribe López (2013, 145, 287).
70 See Aguilera Peña (2014a, 11, 35, 41).
71 Leal Buitrago (2016, 137).
72 Arjona (2016, 182); Aguilera Peña (2014b, 377).
73 See Tilly’s definition of democracy as involving ‘broad, equal, protected, binding consultation of citizens with
respect to state actions’: Tilly (2007, 34).
74 Decree 927/1990 stated that constitutional reforms were required to reinforce state institutions.
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positions in the long-standing conflict, were integrated into core norm-setting activities. Once
drafted, the Constitution endorsed a strong ethic of civil participation (Art 2). In each respect,
the Constitution was driven by a pervasive affirmation of political citizenship, and it reflected
an outlook that viewed intensified collective participation as a technique for galvanizing
society as an aggregate of national citizens and, in so doing, for fortifying national political
institutions.
Alongside this, significantly, the Constitution expressed a new ethic of national integration
by constructing citizenship, in part, on the basis of global norms. Eventually, the Constitution
contributed to the rise of national citizenship in Colombia because it located political partic-
ipation within a global-legal framework, and it attached the exercise of national citizenship to
the enactment of norms, with constitutional force, extracted from the international arena. This
link between national citizenship and global law is manifest, as discussed, in the fact that the
drafting of the Constitution was strongly influenced by rising international enthusiasm for
human rights law. More particularly, however, this link became visible in patterns of consti-
tutional practice that took hold after the Constitution entered force.
To be sure, the 1991 Constitution did not have an immediately solidifying impact on the
rival constituencies in Colombian society. In fact, the years after 1991 were marked by the
escalation of violence and by the assumption of increased autonomy by the local governance
systems constructed by military units, guerrillas, and paramilitaries.75 This period witnessed
the persistence of clientelistic methods of political mobilization, in which patronage remained
a key line of communication between society and government.76 Moreover, this period
witnessed continuing tendencies to very low electoral participation.77 It is thus debatable
whether, after the new Constitution took effect, Colombia became a fully nationalized society,
with a nationally inclusive and integrative political system. Initially, the idea that the Consti-
tution could imprint a unifying ethic of citizenship onto a deeply fissured society proved
illusory.78
Over a longer period of time, however, the socially consolidatory objectives of the 1991
Constitution acquired reality, in part at least. Crucially, these objectives were realized, to a
large degree, not by decisively political processes, but by a mass of legal exchanges. In fact,
the legal system itself began to frame and to facilitate patterns of citizenship practice, which,
slowly, created a more generalized and robustly inclusive foundation for the political system in
society, forming deepening articulations between the governmental order and actors at differ-
ent social and regional locations. In this context, acts of citizenship were expressed, not
solely—or even primarily—through classical patterns of political participation, but through
legal appeals and acts of litigation, often involving reference to global legal principles. As a
result, citizens engaged with the political system, not only as political agents, but also, in part,
as litigants, closely linked to a global normative order, and interactions mediated through the
legal system played a key role in constructing a basis of political integration and legitimation
for society as a whole. The legal system began to operate as a semi-autonomous system, and,
in so doing, it galvanized a series of equivalents to classical political citizenship roles.
75 See González, Bolívar and Vázquez (2003, 168–169); Aguilera Peña (2014b, 173).
76 García Villegas (2009, 74).
77 Electoral participation in Colombia is generally much lower than in most other Latin America countries,
including Chile, Uruguay and Argentina. See Andrés Flórez (2011, 173).
78 Human rights violations escalated through the 1990s (see analysis in Fernando Londoño (2016, 211)).
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3.2.1 Citizenship Formation 1: the Spread of Tutelas
This distinct form of inner-legal citizenship is seen, first, in the societal penetration of
tutela litigation. As discussed, tutela litigation has emerged as a practice in which
individual subjects obtain widened access to rights, often exercising tangible impact
on legislation and policymaking. Such litigation forms a broad opening between the
political system and societal actors, reaching deep into society and forming an
expansive integrational base for the political system.
According to official data, more than 7 million tutelas were submitted between
1992 and 2018 in Colombia.79 In 1997, tutelas represented 3% of the total of legal
actions in Colombia. In 2018, they represented almost 28%, forming the main
mechanism used by citizens to enforce their rights..80 In this same year, it is
calculated that a tutela was filed approximately every minute.81 Furthermore, public
awareness of tutelas is remarkable. More than 80% of the Colombians are aware of
the existence of tutelas, whereas only 20–25% of people are aware of other instru-
ments for collective litigation. Approximately 65.1% of Colombians have a favourable
opinion of this mechanism.82 Significantly, tutela litigation has broad geographical
reach.83 Most tutelas are filed in urban areas. However, the number of cases outside
large population centres has also increased.84 Tutelas address violations in a number
of constitutional spheres. Historically, most tutelas have addressed the right to peti-
tion, the right to health, and a range of economic, social, and cultural rights.
However, claims to other rights have given rise to many tutelas each year. In recent
years, tutelas related to the right to petition and to humanitarian assistance have been
decreasing. Allegedly, this reduction is due to the Peace Agreements and to measures
implemented by institutions created to provide protection for victims of violence (for
instance the Unidad para la Atención y Reparación a las Víctimas). 85 The creation of
new mechanisms for pursuing remedies reveals the institutional strengthening of the
Colombian legal system and indicates that tutelas may reveal priority areas for
defence of rights. In these respects, tutelas have assumed unprecedented importance
as a distinct pattern of citizenship practice, acting to create a unified normative and
territorial environment for the national political system, linking actors at different
societal locations to legislative processes. In view of the fact that, on average, only
circa 40% of the population vote in general and plebiscitary elections, tutelas repre-
sent a primary channel of socio-political participation and incorporation.86
79 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo (2018, 52).
80 Colombia, Rama Judicial, Consejo Superior de la Judicatura (2018, 13–14).
81 Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo (2018, 161).
82 Data are taken from La Rota, Lalinde, Uprimny (2017, 84).
83 In 2018, 1074 of the 1122 (95.7%) existing Colombian municipalities filed at least one tutela for violation of
fundamental rights (see Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo (2018, 61).
84 See Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo (2018, 61-66).
85 See Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo (2018, 53-60). The UARIV (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación
Integral a las Víctimas) was created by Law 1448/2011.
86 See Monsalve Solórzano (2004, 54–72).
171Jus Cogens (2020) 2:155–183
3.2.2 Citizenship Formation 2: Tutelas and New Constitutional Subjects
This distinct form of inner-legal citizenship is evident, second, in the fact that tutela
litigation creates political roles for a range of social groups who struggled historically to
avail themselves of citizenship rights.87 In particular, the Constitutional Court has ruled
that, owing to their marginality and vulnerability, certain subjects need to be granted
require heightened protection when they engage in legal process, and rights established in
tutelas initiated by such subjects should be subject to particularly robust remedies, with
strong guarantees for implementation. In the wake of T-025/04, the Constitutional Court
elaborated the concept of the ‘subject of special constitutional protection’, which it used to
designate groups whose rights require especially secure assurances.88 Subjects placed in
this category include inter alia displaced people, children, elderly people, prison detainees,
women, and ethnic and indigenous groups. Recently, this designation has migrated beyond
cases treated by the Constitutional Court, and it has become a maxim of administrative
law, such that some collective groups now claim elevated protection from administrative
violation.89 There is a strong probability that tutelas and other claims filed by these
subjects will trigger acts of public policy and legislation to guard their rights and avert
further violations, and subjects assuming such protected form possess a legal personality
that allows them to act, in effect, as constitutional subjects.
In such jurisprudence, the Court has attempted to fill the historical void of national
citizenship, aiming to incorporate all subjects, at least minimally, in a shared structure of
normative inclusion.90 Indicatively, the Court has ruled that all citizens in Colombian society
are entitled to enjoy certain rights, and, for persons whose enjoyment of such rights is
impeded, the government has an obligation to take additional steps to facilitate the exercise
of rights at the level of a universal minimum.91 This concept of the universal minimum was
derived, to a large degree, from international law.92 In this respect, global law became a
functional surrogate for the unifying effects of national citizenship. At the same time, the
granting of special protection has meant that subjects in protected categories have been able to
assume quite particular forms of constitutional subjectivity and even to use their protected
status to generate new rights. For example, indigenous groups have been able to assert their
legal personality, not only to preserve given basic rights, but to concretize additional or
subsidiary rights—such as rights to indigenous identity, and rights to recognition and
87 One account describes the position of displaced persons as close to internal ‘statelessness’: Uribe de Hincapié
(2000, 48, 54).
88 Auto 073 of 2014 (Justice Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva).
89 This norm is now also established in administrative law. See Decision Consejo de Estado, Sala de lo
Contencioso Administrativo, Sección Cuarta, 70001-23-33-000-2015-00197-01 AC (2015) (Justice Hugo
Fernando Bastidas Bárcenas) (Council of State). This case recognized indigenous peoples as ‘subjects of special
constitutional protection’. This term has also been used in administrative law to define the status of displaced
persons. See Decision Consejo de Estado, Sala Plena Contenciosa Administrativa, Sección Tercera, 25000-23-
26-000-2001-02697-01(33977) (2015) (Justice Hernán Andrade Rincón) (Council of State).
90 Agnew and Oslender (2010, 210). For parallel claims, see Sebastián Gómez Garcia (2009, 145), arguing that,
in elevating constitutional protection for displaced persons, the Court has established a form of super-citizenship,
to project robustly secured rights into the most abandoned sectors of society.
91 See discussion in Decision T-485 of 2011 (Justice Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva).
92 The classification of women in this category was based in the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (C-667/06), which was used to justify affirmative action for women. The special
position of indigenous groups was based, in part, in rights defined under ILO 169 (Decision T-235 of 2011
(Justice Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva)).
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protection of traditional medicines.93 Moreover, the granting of such protected rights has
meant that rights can be transferred to social subjects living in situations analogous to those
occupied by already protected subjects, so that the ascription of special protection to one group
has generated parallel patterns of subjectivization or personhood amongst similar groups. In
some cases, the Constitutional Court has decided that rights established for indigenous
communities, as subjects of special constitutional protection, need to be broadened so that
they cover other communities, such as African Colombians and even traditional mining
communities.94 Special protection jurisprudence has thus served to create common thresholds
of inclusion for all society. However, this jurisprudence has also given rise to new forms of
citizenship and it has allowed new actors to shape the legal form of society. In this respect,
litigation formed a mode of citizenship that was specifically adapted to the structure of society.
It helped to establish a uniform stratum of national norms to surmount the inherent
polycentricity of society, yet it also allowed the exercise of citizenship rights in subjective
forms reflecting society’s highly variable inner environments, enabling marginal subjects to
obtain access to the political system.
3.2.3 Citizenship Formation 3: Tutelas and Sectoral Citizenship
This distinct form of inner-legal citizenship is seen, third, in the additional patterns of subject
formation that occur in tutela litigation.
In some respects, tutelas do not only serve to articulate existing citizens with the political
system. They also engender new patterns of political subjectivity and citizenship, and they
allow the exercise of citizenship practices in quite spontaneous fashion, often giving rise to
entirely new patterns of legal personhood. One result of human rights litigation in Colombia is
that persons have begun to acquire a separate constitutional personality in the different
functional domains contained in society, and they increasingly form articulations with the
political system, not as generic citizens, but in particular sectors of societal interaction—as
sectoral citizens. In some ways, the Constitutional Court has promoted tutela jurisprudence to
craft a multi-centric sectoral constitution for society as a whole, in which many subjects, often
lacking formal legal identity, acquire the force to consolidate constitutional norms with a
differentiated, functionally specific emphasis, so that multiple, sectoral patterns of citizenship
come into existence. In some such cases, the subject acquiring rights does not formally or
materially exist prior to the recognition of the rights in questions, and the recognition of rights
actually brings the rights-endowed subjects (citizens) into being.
The Constitutional Court began to construct sectoral constitutional norms in some of its first
rulings. In early tutelas, it ruled that the Constitution of 1991 should not be interpreted as a
document restricted to classical constitutional functions of placing limits on state power. On
the contrary, it argued that the Constitution ‘contains the basic legal order for the diverse
sectors of social and political life’. In particular, it stated that the Constitution provides
elements of an economic constitution, based in ‘property, labour, enterprise’, which establishes
elements of a ‘social constitution’, and it sets out principles for an ecological and a cultural
constitution.95 Over a longer period, the Court expanded this approach, and it elaborated a
93 Decision T-001 of 2012 (Justice Juan Carlos Henao Pérez); Decision T-282 of 2011 (Justice Luis Ernesto
Vargas Silva).
94 See Decision SU-133 of 2017 (Justice Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva).
95 Decision T-411 of 1992 (Justice Alejandro Martinez Caballero).
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series of quite differentiated constitutional orders in separate parts of society. Importantly,
these orders were not entirely separate, and all were connected and shaped by the transversal
commitment of the Court to give effect to the value of human dignity. Nonetheless, these
orders acquired striking autonomy in their own sphere of application.
This tendency can be seen, for example, in the sphere of healthcare. Originally, the right to
health was not fully established as a fundamental right in the Constitution. Article 49 of the
Constitution creates an obligation for the state to provide healthcare. However, this obligation
did not originally create a right protectable by tutela: that is, a justiciable fundamental right.
Indeed, the Constitutional Court opined in 1993 that the Constitution ‘does not directly
recognize the right to health’.96 However, in cases of tutela litigation concerning health rights
in the 1990s, the Court established the principle that rights to health should be defined as
fundamental and justiciable parts of the constitutional order. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court promoted a deliberately constitutional approach to healthcare rights, stating that such
rights are immediately enforceable, via tutelas, when they are connected with an ‘immediately
applicable fundamental right’, such as, for example, the right to life.97 In so doing, the Court
constructed fundamental health rights using the principle of connectedness (conexidad). This
principle was used to formulate the claim that there are some rights which, although not
declared fundamental in the Constitution, are ‘fundamental rights by connectedness’: that is,
rights that are constitutionally protected by virtue of their ‘intimate and ineradicable relation
with other fundamental rights’.98 Ultimately, the Constitutional Court intensified its protection
of health rights to declare, simply, that the right to health is a fundamental right.99 Such rulings
were widely supported by international health law principles.100
In these respects, the Constitutional Court established a set of rights that formed a distinct
sectoral constitutional order—a health constitution. In so doing, it also promoted the presump-
tion that the mass of exchanges relating to health contains multiple distinct subjects and
multiple distinct legal communities, not all of which were initially covered by, or visible in,
the formal law of the constitution. The Court expanded the right to health to establish
differential rights, with gradations reflecting the vulnerability of implicated parties. It ruled,
for instance, that the right to health required particular protection in cases where it was denied
to children,101 to the aged,102 and to persons displaced by the civil conflict.103 In these
respects, the Court did not only create new constitutional rights: it created new constitutional
subjects, health subjects, with distinct personality in the health constitution, able distinctively
to claim rights and to affect legislation regarding health rights. The right to health has even
been interpreted to recognize a river, the Atrato running through the Choco province, as
entitled to protection from contamination, owing largely to its importance for the ecosystem of
the region and the health of its inhabitants.104 This ruling relied extensively on international
norms regarding access to food, and international treaties regarding protection of biodiversity
96 See Decision T-597 of 1993 (Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz). This case ruled that state agencies are obliged
to provide health care, but it was not defined as a fundamental right.
97 Decision T-597 of 1993 (Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz).
98 Decision T-491 of 1992 (Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz).
99 Decision T-760 of 2008 (Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa).
100 Decision T-062 of 2006 (Justice Clara Inés Vargas Hernández).
101 Decision T-610 of 2014 (Justice Jorge Ivan Palacio Palacio).
102 Decision T-199 of 2013 (Justice Alexei Julio Estrada).
103 Decision T-239 of 2013 (Justice María Victoria Calle Correa).
104 Decision T-622 of 2016 (Justice Jorge Ivan Palacio Palacio).
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and rights of indigenous communities, especially Convention 169 of the International Labour
Organization (ILO 169).
A related logic is evident in tutela cases concerning the environment. The Colombian
Constitution contains some positive environmental provisions. However, it does not provide
immediate justiciable guarantees for rights to environmental protection. At an early stage in the
development of its jurisprudence, nonetheless, the Constitutional Court ruled that it could hear
tutela cases regarding environmental damage if these cases addressed environmental questions
that caused a potential ‘violation of a fundamental constitutional right, with respect to one or a
number of determinate persons’.105 In its rulings in environmental tutelas, the Court initially
followed a conexidad line of reasoning to establish a right to a healthy environment, arguing
that environmental pollution could lead to the denial of ‘fundamental rights’, such as rights to
‘life, personal integrity, intimacy’, or, by extension, ‘health’.106 The Court found that, as a
matter connected to life and health, the state had an obligation to introduce policies to reduce
environmental damage as a ‘priority public service’.107 Eventually, the Court declared that
environmental rights were of a fundamental nature,108 and even that they formed ‘rights of
constitutional rank’.109 Notably, the determination of such rights was supported by extensive
citation from international law.110
As in health law, the establishment of constitutional rights in environmental litigation gave
rise to a line of jurisprudence, in which certain sectoral subjects acquired new legal visibility.
Environmental obligations have acquired particular importance in cases affecting minority
communities, such as indigenous populations, especially when their traditional lands are
affected. In such cases, the Constitutional Court has found a heightened administrative duty
for the government to prevent environmental damage.111 In cases where building works,
mining activities or developmental projects have risked causing environmental damage, the
Court has dictated that there should be provisions for prior consultation with indigenous
communities and that due recognition should be shown for their right to cultural integrity.112
Notably, such rulings widely relied on international law, especially ILO 169. In some
environmental cases, animals have also been configured as legal subjects, entitled to protection
from cruelty.113 These rights were deemed to flow from the basic constitutional right to
ecological balance, from the character of animals as ‘sentient beings’, and from the general
environmental interest in the maintenance of biodiversity and the natural equilibrium of
species.114
A similar sequence of steps can be seen in judicial constructions of the right to education. In
the first instance, the 1991 Constitution did not place the right to education under fully
enforceable constitutional protection. Article 67 states that education is an individual right.
However, this right was not included in the list of rights subject to immediate and binding
105 Decision T-257 of 1996 (Justice Antonio Barrera Carbonell).
106 Decision T-046 of 1999 (Justice Hernando Herrera Vergara).
107 Decision T-046 of 1999 (Justice Hernando Herrera Vergara).
108 Decision C-431 of 2000 (Justice Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa).
109 Decision T-760 of 2007 (Justice Clara Inés Vargas Hernández).
110 See especially Decision T-608 of 2011 (Justice Juan Carlos Henao Pérez).
111 See Decision T-428 of 1992 (Justice Ciro Angarita Baron).
112 A classic example is Decision C-418 of 2002 (Justice Alvaro Tafur Galvis). In a recent decision, the right to
consultation is extended to other actors perhaps impairing the right to cultural integrity. See Decision SU-133 of
2017 (Justice Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva).
113 Decision C-666 of 2010 (Justice Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto).
114 Decision C-666 of 2010 (Justice Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto).
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constitutional guarantees. Despite this, the Constitutional Court established the principle that
the right to education possessed a fundamental quality, insisting on its ‘close linkage’ with the
basic values enunciated in the Constitution, and it concluded that the right to education could
be subject to tutela.115 The Court also used the doctrine of the block of constitutionality to
cement this right,116 and relevant jurisprudence was marked by broad use of international
law.117 Over a longer period, the basic right to education was expanded to generate more
differentiated rights, as the Court ruled that the government was under obligation to offer
education that was available, accessible, acceptable, and adaptable: the right to education
acquired four subsidiary characteristics.118 This implied, for example, that the right to educa-
tion was relatively neutral to the social location of the claimants to this right, and the
government was expected to offer education to all social groups, even in remote regions.119
As above, the emergent education constitution in Colombia provides recognition for new
legal persons, as subjects of the education constitution, and it enables persons to shape and
construct new constitutional rights. Naturally, the right to education is particularly entrenched
for children. However, disabled persons and persons with learning difficulties are perceived as
educational subjects with elevated constitutional protection, who require particularly strong
guarantees of access to education.120 Indigenous population groups have also acquired a
distinct personality in this regard, and they are recognized as possessing a right to a ‘special
system’ of education, tailored to their cultural needs, flowing from the right to identity.121 In
many instances, such rights were created through a direct articulation between national and
international legal norms.122
This list of sectoral constitutions and sectoral constitutional subjects in Colombian law is
not exhaustive. However, developments in health law, environmental law, and education law
have an exemplary quality. These constitutions have evolved in spontaneous fashion; in many
cases, they have been developed on contingent foundations, and they do not extract authority
from a clearly positivized set of legal norms. Above all, these constitutions have been created
by acts of sectoral citizenship, in which litigation concerning domain-specific rights creates
new avenues for legal inclusion and law production. In the construction of these constitutions,
a condition of sectoral citizenship emerges alongside more classical majoritarian patterns of
interest representation. In this process, the construction of sectoral norms by distinct functional
subjects replaces the representation of the people as a collective actor, and persons enter the
political system through multiple channels of articulation, usually linked to litigation for
particular global rights. This enables rights and forms of subjecthood to appear that could
not easily take hold in more conventional legislative systems. In the context of a society
marked historically by uneven nationalization of citizenship practices and by weak capacity of
state institutions to interact with citizens in unitary form, the sectoralization of citizenship
creates compensatory, socially proportioned openings for legal recognition and participation in
law making. The political form of the citizen thus emerges, eminently, through legal actions,
115 This position has been settled since the decision in Decision T-406 of 1992 (Justice Ciro Angarita Baron).
116 Decision T-306 of 2011 (Justice Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto).
117 Decision T-458 of 2013 (Justice Jorge Ignacio Pretelt Chaljub).
118 Decision T-743 of 2013 (Justice Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva).
119 Decision T-743 of 2013 (Justice Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva).
120 Decision T-247 of 2014 (Justice Mauricio González Cuervo); Decision T-513 of 1999 (Justice Martha
Victoria Sáchica de Moncaleano).
121 Decision T-907 of 2011 (Justice Jorge Ignacio Pretelt Chaljub).
122 In Decision T-601 of 2011 (Justice Jorge Ivan Palacio Palacio) the right to special education provisions for
indigenous people is justified through use of the block of constitutionality.
176 Jus Cogens (2020) 2:155–183
and the representation of society through citizenship rights occurs, primarily, as an inner-legal
process.
3.2.4 Citizenship Formation 4: Public Interest Litigation
This distinct form of inner-legal citizenship is seen, fourth, in the expansion of legal agency in
Colombia. One implication of the growing autonomy of the legal system is that actors across
society have recognized that litigation is a core domain of collective norm formation, and
political groups and social movements increasingly engage in litigation to obtain legislative
outcomes and to establish new rights of recognition. Consequently, the Constitutional Court
has acted as a ‘catalyst’ for waves of legal mobilization—for example, for indigenous rights,
gender rights, and ethnic rights.123 Indicatively, T-025/04 was filed by a collective litigator,
and other leading tutelas have been strategically filed to gain heightened recognition for
collective subjects.
Alongside the growth of tutelas, the period since 1991, and especially up to 2010, saw a rise
in public interest litigation, in administrative law.124 Like tutelas, public interest litigation in
Colombia now forms a core constitutional instrument for securing rights, especially histori-
cally unconsolidated rights, such as environmental rights and healthcare rights.125 One envi-
ronmental case, the famous Rio Bogotá case, led to a ruling with very broad legislative reach,
which both instituted and financed an integrated and co-ordinated system for decontaminating
and managing water supplies around Bogotá.126 The importance of public interest litigation in
Colombia is tied to the fact that, under Law 472, Art. 40 (1998), public agencies are required to
act in accordance with broadly defined standards of administrative morality, which impose
moral obligations on all organs of government.127 On this basis, society is deemed to have a
collective interest in the morality of governmental and quasi-governmental agents and even a
right to moral administration. Litigation against public bodies can be initiated when this right is
not recognized. This right has very broadly applicable force, and it provides wide standing for
litigants in public interest cases. Moreover, this right provides substantial scope for litigants to
affect public policies, as it presumes that policies must be sensitive to public interests and can
be appealed on the grounds that they are not.128 International law has been commonly invoked
to strengthen claims made in public interest cases.129
123 See Sandoval Rojas (2013, 203).
124 Such cases increased after 1991. However, subsequent to Law 1425/2010, which eliminated economic
incentives for public interest litigators (articles 39 and 40), the number of cases decreased significantly.
According to the Consejo Superior de la Judicatura, between 2009 and 2013, the number of cases decreased
by 77% (see Páez-Murcia, Lamprea-Montealegre and Vallejo-Piedrahíta 2017).
125 See analysis in Coral-Díaz et al. (2010). The ‘collective right to administrative morality’ is established in Law
472/1998. However, this right presupposes ‘concretion’ by the courts: Matallano Camacho (2010, 152).
126 Decision Consejo de Estado, Sala Plena Contenciosa Administrativa, Sección Primera, 25000-23-27-000-
2001-90,479-01 AP (2014) (Justice Marco Antonio Velilla Moreno) (Council of State). In Colombia, lack of
resources cannot excuse a public body for not fulfilling the terms of a ruling in a public-interest case. See
Decision Consejo de Estado, Sala Contenciosa Administrativa, Sección Primera, 18001-23-31-000-2011-00256-
01 AP (2015) (Justice Guillermo Vargas Ayala) (Council of State).
127 The ‘collective right to administrative morality’ is established in Law 472/1998. However, this right is
conceived in the spirit of an ‘open texture’ and presupposes precise ‘concretion’ by the courts, thus allowing the
courts latitude in constructing the content of the right (see Matallano Camacho (2010, 152)).
128 Fager Sáenz and Díaz Márquez (2013, 59).
129 The ruling in the Río Bogotá case makes extensive use of international law.
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The democratically formative role of public interest litigation in Colombia has been
accentuated by the Constitutional Court, which has accorded to such litigation a clearly
political, constitutive force. In some leading opinions, which define the scope of public interest
litigation, the Court has declared that public interest cases should be encouraged as an
instrument for promoting ‘law based in participation and solidarity’. Most importantly, it has
construed litigation of this type as a practice for protecting interests of a very strictly collective
nature, of relevance for all citizens, not attached to specific subjects, and not registered through
damages to clearly identified rights.130 In leading relevant case law, it has been ruled that, in
public interest cases, matters should be treated that do not have a ‘subjective or individual
content’, and which do not relate to a ‘damage that can be repaired subjectively’.131 In
consequence, such cases are focused on ‘collective rights, in contrast to individual rights’:
on rights that ‘belong to the entire community’, and whose holder ‘is a plurality of persons’.132
Standing for filing such cases, consequently, depends solely on membership in the national
community, and no other claim apart from interests inherent in citizenship is required to justify
legal proceedings.133 Collective litigation is thus clearly envisioned as a forum, in which
uncertainly defined subjects can take legal shape, and emergent social concerns can be
transmitted towards the political system. In some ways, it forms an ultra-sensitive channel of
political communication, which promotes highly diffuse citizenship practices and opens the
political system to interests not easily expressed by conventional political subjects.
None of these observations is intended to imply that judicial interactions devised a
miraculous remedy for problems of weak institutional integration or incomplete elaboration
of citizenship rights in Colombia. In some respects, however, the rise in litigation, especially in
tutelas, can be seen to have modified, not only the legal system, but also the legitimational
structure of the polity, creating compensatory conditions of national integration and national
citizenship in a society historically marked by low inclusion of citizens. In particular, human
rights, based in global norms but constructed and protected through tutelas, form an inter-
group vocabulary of legal understanding, which connects different parts of society, and links
social agents, at different societal positions, to the political system.134 Through these various
processes, Colombia has assumed the form of a democracy that contains multiple subjects
(citizens) capable of participating in legal/political activities, such that the range of persons
able to play a role in the construction of legal norms has been greatly widened. This means that
the political system is able to produce and legitimate legislation in many ways, and it is
articulated with persons requiring legislation in its environment through many channels, each
of which is accessed by a range of different subjects. Legal exchanges form a key line of
political communication, in which social demands are translated into law, and legal exchanges
themselves create new acts of legislation, new constitutional norms, and new legal subjects
(citizens). The autonomous force of law, in other words, is not a limit on democracy: the legal
system itself, sustained by strong presumptions in favour of global human rights, is the basic
source of democratic formation and integration, and it even constructs the subjects on which
democracy relies. The political system has evolved as a multi-articulated democracy, in which
130 Decision C-215 of 1999 (Justice Martha Victoria Sáchica de Moncaleano). The Court has defined solidarity
itself as a ‘constitutional value’ (Decision C-459 of 2004 (Justice Jaime Araújo Rentería)).
131 Decision T-528 of 1992 (Justice Fabio Moron Diaz).
132 Decision T-254 of 1993 (Justice Antonio Barrera Carbonell).
133 Decision T-528 of 1992 (Justice Fabio Moron Diaz).
134 Lemaitre Ripoll (2009, 107).
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new channels of interaction, partly constructed within the law itself, replace classical patterns
of participation and will formation.
The political institutions in Colombian society struggled, historically, to generate demo-
cratic citizenship on national foundations alone. In fact, purely national political institutions
did not create a fully nationalized society. Eventually, more stable patterns of citizenship and
stable patterns of national inclusion began to emanate from exchanges within the legal system,
acting at a heightened level of autonomy. National citizenship was created, in part, through an
alignment of national law to global law, and global law was used to design adaptive models of
national citizenship which national institutions themselves had not established.
4 Conclusion
In many respects, Colombia is a paradigmatic example of polity with a transnational judicial
constitution, usually seen as comprising a set of global legal norms that limit political-
democratic modes of agency. However, the case of Colombia demands that we re-formulate
our approach to constitutions shaped by autonomous interactions between national law and
global law. What is discernible in Colombia is that the distinctive global-legal form of the
constitutional order only contradicts norms of democratic legitimacy if democracy is under-
stood in sociologically unreflected categories. The Colombian Constitution has in fact created
a foundation for the emergence of a distinctive pattern of democracy, in which global legal
rights stimulate the formation of multiple lines of articulation between the political system and
society. In this respect, litigation appears as an important source of norms with de facto
constitutional rank, and litigation triggers the emergence of new patterns of citizenship. As a
result, the Constitution needs to be seen as a document that greatly facilitates the exercise of
participatory political agency, locking the political system into its societal environment by
opening up multiple processes of socio-political engagement and norm construction, and even
materializing new political subjects.
Analysis of Colombian constitutionalism tells us that common approaches to judicial
constitutionalism are sociologically naïve in their understandings of politics and democratic
practice. This model may appear as a deficient form of democracy to perspectives that insist
that majority-mandated legislation is the sole authorized expression of the popular will.135 If
democracy is viewed as a political order that maximizes popular participation and allows a
maximum number of persons to recognize laws as outcomes of their own engagement, the
judicial-constitutional model can easily, in some settings, realize democratic normative expec-
tations more fully than classical democratic systems. This model gives reality to the claim in
early sociology that democracy is a system of consensual inclusion, in which rights of
citizenship are exercised and construct legitimacy for law in multiple fashion. In this model,
access to law making depends, not on the possession of a majoritarian mandate, but on the
capacity of actors to challenge for and exercise globally acknowledged rights, so that rights
provide thresholds of legitimate participation and pre-figure outcomes of such participation.136
In the case of Colombia, the rise of a transnational judicial constitutionalism has tended to
enhance the quality of the political system as a distinctive public order, open to citizens at
different locations in society and capable of extending an overarching system of norms across
135 Waldron (1999, 166).
136 For a similar insight, see Kingsbury (2009).
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society. By contrast, in comparable societies that have recently abandoned judicial constitu-
tionalism in favour of more direct models of mobilization, national political systems have
almost invariably begun to show symptoms of privatism and patrimonialism as techniques for
generating societal support.137 Clearly, many forms of political communication that have
evolved in Colombia will simply disappear if the autonomous power of the legal system is
reduced.
In a world in which many democracies have suddenly become fragile, it is important to
avoid burdening democratic political systems with the expectation that they comply with
legitimational expectations that are not matched to actual patterns of integration and
subject formation in society. The act of looking for the people as a fully implicated
political subject in democracy, lying somewhere beneath the system of equivalence on
which democracy often depends, can easily destroy the complex, compensatory forms, in
which democratic citizenship becomes real. The future of democracy itself may well
depend on the use of a sociologically measured perspective for understanding democracy,
able to identify varied and contingent ways in which global law articulates premises for the
legitimation of laws in national societies and for national citizenship more widely. The
future of Colombian democracy, currently under threat because of its judicial bias, may
have implications that extend far beyond Colombia itself.
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